Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International
Journal
Volume 11
Issue 3 Global Approaches to Atrocity
Prevention: Theory, Practice, and the State of
the Field

Article 6

3-2018

Germany’s Politics and Bureaucracy for Preventing Atrocities
Sarah Brockmeier
Global Public Policy Institute

Philipp Rotmann
Global Public Policy Institute

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp

Recommended Citation
Brockmeier, Sarah and Rotmann, Philipp (2018) "Germany’s Politics and Bureaucracy for Preventing
Atrocities," Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal: Vol. 11: Iss. 3: 20-31.
DOI:
http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3.1582

Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp/vol11/iss3/6
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Scholar Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal by an authorized editor of
Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Germany’s Politics and Bureaucracy for Preventing Atrocities
Sarah Brockmeier

Global Public Policy Institute
Berlin, Germany

Philipp Rotmann

Global Public Policy Institute
Berlin, Germany
Germany has accepted the unique responsibility arising from its history. The avoidance of
war and violence in international relations, the prevention of genocide and severe violations
of human rights, and the defence of endangered minorities and the victims of oppression
and persecution are integral to Germany’s reason of state.1

As of June 2017, this is official German government policy, adopted by the federal cabinet as the
highest executive organ in its “Guidelines on Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building
Peace.” Compared to earlier policy documents, the ambition is expressed more strongly than
ever: raison d’état, or reason of state, is vernacular usually reserved for Germany’s unwavering
commitment to the survival of the state of Israel.
The statement quoted above must be seen in the context of Germany’s broader coming of age in
matters of international leadership. It does not describe the emphasis on preventing genocide and
mass atrocities in current policy. Interpreting this aspiration and its prospects for shaping future
policy requires substantial background on the past and present of Germany’s political debates
and bureaucratic infrastructure on crisis prevention, atrocity prevention, and responsibility to
protect.
This paper consists of two main sections. The first introduces the political context and recent
history of Germany’s institutional setup for atrocity prevention. The second describes this setup
and explains its strengths and weaknesses, as well as the key challenges to be addressed in order to
live up to the aspiration of making more effective contributions to the prevention of genocide and
other atrocities. We conclude with an outlook on Germany’s contributions to atrocity prevention
in the next few years.
Context: Debates on Prevention and Intervention in Germany
Atrocity prevention as a distinct category in German political debates is fairly new and still rarely
used. Over the past 15 years, the issues that were discussed in the US as atrocity prevention were
linked either to the responsibility to protect (R2P) or to conflict prevention, which is referred to as
“crisis prevention” in the German debate.2 Part of the reason for this is evident in the language.
There is no consistent, agreed-upon phrase for “mass atrocities” in German. However, the two
debates about R2P and conflict prevention have been almost completely disconnected from one
another: the R2P debate is tainted by its association with military intervention, while the conflict
prevention debate is shaped by an emphasis on long-term, structural peacebuilding with civilian
means. Accordingly, atrocity prevention is almost never treated as a category in itself, and there is
little awareness of the differences between conflict and atrocity prevention.3
“Never Again What?” Contradicting Historical Lessons at the Center of the Prevention Debate
Key to comprehending German views on all three categories – R2P, conflict prevention and atrocity
prevention – is understanding the societal and historical debates in Germany on these topics. This
1
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The German policy community uses the term “crisis prevention” (“Krisenprävention”) where most English speaking
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is linked to Germany’s own history and the Holocaust, but also the history of the peace movement
and its role in shaping the internationalist left. The distinct meaning and use of the pivotal term
“never again” in Germany illustrates a key difference to the United States.
In the US, genocide prevention advocates, Holocaust survivors, and high-ranking politicians
regularly draw comparisons between the Holocaust and mass atrocities in Rwanda, Srebrenica,
Darfur or Syria.4 Historical responsibility, in that interpretation, includes not only remembering
the past but also fighting mass atrocities today.
In Germany, the phrase “never again” is used in two ways. First, to refer to “never again war,”
the conclusion drawn from the responsibility for two World Wars that expresses the core of the
pacifist streak in mainstream German society. Second, where “never again” is used in reference
to the Holocaust (“never again Auschwitz”), it is usually interpreted as a responsibility to prevent
right-wing ideology, racism, and fascism in Germany. When, in 1999, then-foreign minister
Joschka Fischer used “never again Auschwitz” to mobilize support for the military intervention
in Kosovo, he was heavily criticized for abusing the phrase and diminishing the singularity of
the Holocaust. Since then, politicians hardly ever make such connections. In the German peace
movement, including significant parts of the foreign policy community from the left of the political
spectrum, the Kosovo intervention is still hugely controversial.
In 2001, the International Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty that developed
the idea of a responsibility to protect actually had a prominent German member. Klaus Naumann
had recently retired as the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee and previously served as the
Inspector-General, effectively the Chief of Staff, of the German Bundeswehr. Known as a passionate
advocate for muscular intervention in the Balkans, Naumann was put in charge of the chapter
on military options by the Commission. The German government, however, did everything to
ignore that Naumann existed: the defense department refused to meet or even reply to his requests
for guidance, and the Foreign Office directed him to junior officials who received his occasional
reports about the proceedings but refused to provide him with any insight into the considerations
of the government on the matter.5
It took a whole decade, as well as a controversial German vote in the UN Security Council,
to bring the R2P debate home. Beginning in 2005, when the UN General Assembly endorsed a
version of R2P, German policymakers treated the concept as a legal norm in the making that
required German support at the level of the European Union and the United Nations, mostly
in the sense of including the words “responsibility to protect” in statements and resolutions.6
In 2011, Germany’s controversial abstention on a resolution authorizing an intervention in
Libya triggered the first genuinely public debate on R2P in Germany.7 Mainstream newspapers
published editorials on R2P’s origin and purpose, and parties in the Bundestag voiced their support
for R2P in party motions. In this context, German policymakers began to see R2P as not only
international law in the making, but also a moral principle and a practical commitment that needs
operationalization.
The dominant links to Kosovo and Libya, however, exemplify the bias in the public perception
of atrocity prevention in Germany. To this day, every debate about preventing or stopping atrocities
gets short-circuited into a debate about military intervention. Whatever the political decision,
whether Germany refuses to employ military force, as in Libya, or whether it breaks a longstanding
taboo and delivers military assistance, as in Iraq in 2014, as soon as the military question is settled,
the debate ends. How best to use and equip German armed forces for such interventions, or which
other diplomatic, economic, or judicial tools the German government has at its disposal, is hardly
ever subject to public or even expert discussion.

4

See, for example, Elie Wiesel, “Genocide Prevention Initiative Launch” (speech, Washington, DC, April 23, 2012), United
States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed February 20, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_xTGJxYp76w.
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Interviews with former German policymakers, Berlin, Summer 2013.
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Protect,” Conflict, Security and Development 14, no. 4 (2014), 448-449.
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Little Civil Society and Political Pressure
The open public dispute over Germany’s lessons from history may also partly explain why
the German public and civil society advocacy are relatively listless and lackluster on atrocity
prevention. Whereas US reforms on atrocity prevention have been significantly driven by civil
society mobilization, there is no comparable NGO infrastructure devoted to the issue in Germany.
Most internationalist civil society organizations, including religious and human rights groups,
build on an anti-imperialist, often pacifist tradition of opposing American interventions during
the Cold War and beyond. They advocate for human rights and peace in general, but hardly any of
them work on atrocity prevention specifically. Instead of embracing R2P as an advocacy tool, most
of them see the principle primarily as a back-door attempt to legitimize military adventures. There
are very few exceptions: Genocide Alert, Crisis Action, Human Rights Watch Germany, and the
Society for Threatened Peoples are the main groups.8 In contrast to the US, Germany does not have
large-scale advocacy campaigns pressuring the government to take action on particular country
cases or to improve its atrocity prevention tools.
All of this makes atrocity prevention an unattractive and even difficult issue for political
leaders to support. Most of the prominent or semi-prominent politicians who do support a stronger
German leadership role on atrocity prevention prefer to do so quietly, rather than championing the
issue in public and risking to alienate voters.
In the European Union as a whole, dynamics are similar. Although a large number of groups are
committed to peace and human rights, the topic of atrocity prevention does not play a substantial
role in major human rights organizations.9 There are also fewer political entrepreneurs, such as
Samantha Power, who alternate between civil society and bureaucracy. Compared to the United
States, political elites and the bureaucracy in both Germany and the European Union are less open
to exchange with academia and civil society in general.
These differences between the United States and the European Union are exemplified by a
comparison between the results of the U.S. Genocide Prevention Task Force (GPTF) and the fate
of the attempted European replica, the Task Force on the EU Prevention of Mass Atrocities.10 The EU
Task Force, in 2012, provided a thorough assessment of the EU’s strengths and weaknesses on mass
atrocity prevention and provided a list of recommendations to European institutions on how to
improve the institutional set-up of the EU (some of which we repeat below). Yet while many of the
GPTF’s recommendations were taken up by the Obama administration, the EU Task Force’s report
seems to have largely been forgotten shortly after its presentation in early 2013. The key difference
between the EU and the US version of the reports was not the quality of their content, but the
political clout of their drafters. The most important feature of the Genocide Prevention Task Force
was its composition, a veritable who’s who of credible foreign and security policy experts, chaired
by Madeline Albright and William Cohen. This was vital to its acceptance as an objective among
Washington’s political elite. The European equivalent, initiated by a Hungarian NGO, failed to
receive such high-level political backing for its work—a reflection of the differing conditions for
promoting mass atrocity prevention between the US and the European Union.
Recent Growth in Responsibility
Despite the shortcomings in the political and societal context for atrocity prevention debates
in Germany and the EU, Berlin’s role in the world and willingness to take on responsibility has
been growing. This has important side effects for atrocity prevention, as we will show in the next
section.

8

One of the authors was a board member of Genocide Alert from 2010 to 2015. More information on Genocide Alert’s
work can be found at http://www.genocide-alert.de.
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Chiara De Franco, Christoph O. Meyer, and Karen E. Smith, “‘Living by Example?’ The European Union and the
Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P),” Journal of Common Market Studies 53, no. 5 (2015), 994–1009.
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Budapest Centre for the International Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, The EU and the Prevention of Mass
Atrocities – An Assessment of Strengths and Weaknesses (Hungary: Foundation for the International Prevention of
Genocide and Mass Atrocities, February 2013), accessed December 31, 2017, http://massatrocitiestaskforce.eu/Report_
files/The EU and the prevention of mass atrocities - an assessment of strenghts and weaknesses.pdf.
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For a long time, Germans have seen events in distant war zones as something that does
not concern them. This has been changing. The 2015 refugee crisis confronted many previously
unconcerned Germans with the reality of wars and atrocities in far-away places. Chancellor Angela
Merkel summarized this tendency in an unusually candid fashion in the fall of 2015: “In many
regions war and terror prevail. States disintegrate. For many years we have read about this. We
have heard about it. We have seen it on TV. But we had not yet sufficiently understood that what
happens in Aleppo and Mosul can affect Essen or Stuttgart. We have to face that now.”11
German support of the negotiations with Iran, Berlin’s central role in addressing the crisis in
Ukraine, its decision to arm the Kurdish Peshmerga in their fight against IS as well as its support of
the anti-IS coalition with up to 1200 German troops are all signs that Germany is taking increasing
responsibility. Polls show unprecedented backing for this approach. In annual polling about public
attitudes toward security issues, record numbers of Germans reported that they now support an
active role in addressing the problems, crises and conflicts of the world. After 2000, support for this
question usually lingered between the mid-40s and mid-50s; in many years, there was essentially
a tie between supporters and opponents of an active role. In 2014, the picture changed. Suddenly,
there were clear majorities in favor: support jumped to 59%, then 66% (2015) and then 63% (2016),
with fewer than 35% opposed each year.12
In this context of growing international ambitions, based on a foundation of growing public
support, the last administration issued two new foundational documents about Germany’s
international posture. In the summer of 2016, a new defense white paper was issued, while a year
later, in the summer of 2017, guidelines on “Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace”
followed. Both documents broke new ground in placing Germany’s responsibility for international
peace and security in the context of its historical past. In so doing, the government has begun to
turn a powerful argument that had previously been used mostly to support restraint and passivity
into a justification, even a requirement, for the country to play a more active role.
Both documents are formally of equal status, adopted by the entire cabinet as the highest
organ of the executive, and both are meant to express a cross-party consensus that should hold for
the next five to ten years, regardless of changes in government. At the same time, German security
policy continues to be lopsidedly biased toward territorial and alliance defense, and the defense
white paper—which does not go into any kind of detail on atrocity prevention—is thus seen as
significantly more important than the guidelines. The effective political weight of the guidelines
remains to be seen in the coming years.
Germany’s Institutional Setup for Atrocity Prevention
Who Owns Atrocity Prevention? Inter-agency Coordination
The administration of Germany’s international relations is based primarily on the country’s
parliamentary system of government and an electoral system that usually leads to coalition
governments. Germany’s Basic Law firmly enshrines the “Ressortprinzip” (usually translated as
“departmental principle”) that grants a high degree of autonomy and responsibility to individual
ministries. Compared to many other Western democracies, these legal foundations and the decades
of political custom built on them have produced an unusually weak role for the Chancellery
in any but the top-tier foreign policy issues of the day. The day-to-day policymaking process
is supposed to be coordinated by the Foreign Office but on any overlapping policy issues, its
leadership role is often challenged by either the Defense or the Development Ministry. In contrast
to almost any other country in the world, the latter is a separate ministry, independent from the
Foreign Office.
These general observations have a number of implications for atrocity prevention. First,
Germany’s Federal Security Council is largely defunct as a policy-making forum on international
11

Karl Vick and Simon Shuster, “Time Person of the Year: Chancellor of the Free World,” TIME, December 9, 2015,
accessed December 31, 2017, http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2015-angela-merkel/.
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Markus Steinbrecher, et al., Security and Defense Policy Opinion climate in the Federal Republic of Germany (Potsdam: Centre
for Military History and Social Sciences of the German Armed Forces, 2016), accessed December 31, 2017, http://www.
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security; its main role is to take decisions about arms exports. On conflict prevention and
peacebuilding, the existing working level coordination group has done little more than facilitate
information exchange between various ministries. There is no other cabinet-level forum to
coordinate international security or prevention issues, not even a single deputies-level forum
with this kind of broad mandate. After years of constant squabbling, the cabinet decided in June
2017 to pilot a “coordination group for crisis prevention, stabilization and peacebuilding” among
directors-general (roughly equivalent to undersecretaries in the U.S. administration). Its future
under the new administration depends on the arrangements and decisions to be taken by the next
government.
Second, given these structural challenges, there is little inter-agency strategy development on
conflict prevention and stabilization in general, let alone atrocity prevention. In addition, so far,
German political leaders across all ministries lack an overview of the tools available for atrocity
prevention. What is still missing is an inter-agency review that could provide an overview of
existing instruments and capabilities and that not only refers to the tools of the Foreign Office
and the Ministry of Defense, but also include the contributions by the Development Ministry,
intelligence services, as well as the Ministries of Justice, Finance and the Interior.
Conflict Prevention, Stabilization and R2P in the Foreign Office
If there is no structure akin to the Atrocities Prevention Board coordinating inter-agency
prevention initiatives, is there at least an individual in any of the ministries responsible for such
coordination? In the fall of 2012, the German foreign office named the deputy director of its UN
division the R2P focal point. However, successive focal points have mostly viewed themselves as
the German representative at international focal point meetings organized by the Global Centre
for the Responsibility to Protect. None of the German focal points of the past five years considered
themselves responsible for looking inward and examining how the German government could
improve its coordination and improve its tools for atrocity prevention.13
The relative neglect of R2P stands in stark contrast to the huge build-up of resources for “crisis
prevention, stabilization, peacebuilding and humanitarian aid,” which is the name of an entirely
new directorate-general created in 2014. As of 2017, it has more than 100 staff and an annual budget
of more than 2 billion euro, the largest part of which is being spent on humanitarian aid. After
the most recent reshuffling in the summer of 2017, there is now a division for “strategic foresight,
early warning, scenario planning, R2P and civilian experts” as part of the new directorate-general.
It supports the R2P focal point and seeks to keep track of atrocity risks as part of its broader early
warning and early action efforts (see below).
The Foreign Office has long funded projects for what is known as civilian crisis prevention
– usually without a link to an explicit conflict analysis or strategy process, but rather based on
suggestions or requests from embassies or implementers (mostly NGOs) submitting proposals.
In the fall of 2012, along with designating a formal R2P focal point, it began designating already
existing crisis prevention projects as R2P projects to be able to respond to international or civil
society questions about its operational footprint. Of course, the distinction between crisis, conflict,
and atrocity prevention is usually more relevant at the analytical stage (to avoid missing certain
risks) than at the level of programming.
An even larger proportion of the increased spending—hundreds of millions of euros per year
in recent years—goes into civilian stabilization projects. Again, there is no formal distinction made
between funding for atrocity prevention or R2P. Many of these projects seek to re-establish basic
public services along with the social fabric of communities after civil war, displacement, and/
or atrocities. Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, among others, are priority countries. In recent years,
some of this support went to supporting communities outside government or extremist control in
Syria. Some projects promote inter-ethnic reconciliation or similar efforts that might be considered
contributions to atrocity prevention in particular, while others follow merely broadly similar goals.
However, despite significant conceptual investments into the improvement of programming for

13

Brockmeier, The Future of Germany’s Support.

©2018

Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, no. 3 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3.1502

Germany’s Politics and Bureaucracy for Preventing Atrocities

25

crisis prevention and stabilization at large, the role of atrocity prevention or R2P in decisions about
priority countries or program design remains unaddressed.
Early Warning
A prerequisite for prevention is the ability of government bureaucracies to develop appropriate
strategic policy options at an early stage and in every new phase of escalation. In most cases, however,
violence escalates while the pressure to act only mounts as a response to media attention, at which
point it is too late for most forms of prevention. As in other countries, German decision-makers
are then too often confronted with the choice between either authorizing a military intervention—
with all the associated political and practical risks of such an intervention, which translate
into significant obstacles for such a decision—or just standing by while the slaughter unfolds.
For this reason, it is critically important to create political instruments that provide a wider
range of policy options at all stages of violent escalation14 and increase the government’s capacity
to detect crises early. Related to the lack of coordination structures in the German administration,
there are several individual early warning tools by different ministries, but no opportunities to
analyze their results together and adjust the German government’s strategy and programing
accordingly.
While the foreign ministry draws on its embassies, there is little incentive for individual
ambassadors to raise the alarm bells. Diplomats themselves are overextended, since embassies in
at-risk countries are often too small and their freedom of movement is restricted. In some cases,
embassies have been closed precisely at a time at which particularly close monitoring of the situation
would have been decisive. There is no training for the diplomatic corps or embassy personnel on R2P
or the risk factors in atrocity prevention (let alone for intelligence agents or development workers).
Aid workers regularly complain about the lack of reporting from the government on violence and
conflict risks, while government representatives prohibit them from publicizing their own earlywarning analyses. The Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development commissions annual
country assessments by the German Institute of Global and Area Studies, which classifies the 90
countries that the ministry works in into three categories: low risk of conflict, increased risk of
conflict, acute risk of conflict. This traffic light-style system is supposed to guide country desk
officers in longer-term programming decisions and is shared with the Foreign Office, but there is
no systematic, unified approach by the whole government to assessing the results of the different
early warning instruments and devising a response.
The situational awareness provided by the intelligence services with regard to atrocities is even
more deficient, largely because threats to Germany dominate the mission of the Federal Intelligence
Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND).15 Meanwhile, German military advisors serving in fragile
countries are not even required to report on conflict or atrocity risks. Some of them consider any
kind of critical reporting on local partners, even within their confidential internal channels, as
damaging to their trust-building mission.
Mediation Capacities and Sanctions
The new government guidelines on crisis prevention and peacebuilding identify German support
to mediation initiatives as a priority and commit the government to strengthening its own capacities
as well as those of international institutions. The government also promises to appoint more highranking special envoys for specific crises. Germany might also be able to increase its support to
mediation capacities on a European level; in many cases, the EU as a whole can be better placed to
mediate than individual member states. In recent years, the Mediation Support Team within the
European External Action Service (EEAS) has provided technical support to mediation processes
in Mali, Myanmar, Lebanon, South Sudan, CAR, and Ukraine.16
14

Compare to Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002).

15

German Federal Government, “Konfliktregionen weltweit,” Bundesnachrichtendienst, accessed November
10, 2017, http://www.bnd.bund.de/DE/Themen/Lagebeitraege/Konfliktregionen/Konflikte_node.
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Similarly, the guidelines promise to strengthen targeted sanctions and sanctions regimes—
something that the German government would do through the European Union as well. The threat
or imposition of targeted sanctions such as visa and travel bans, or the freezing of assets against
individual perpetrators, is one tool at the disposal of the international community to deter atrocities.
In comparison to the United States, the EU’s capacity to impose and monitor targeted sanctions
remains very weak. While more than 180 people are dedicated to designing and implementing
sanctions at the US Treasury, some US policymakers complain that they face just a handful of
people at the EEAS to deal with the measures.17 Here the EU could learn from the US experience, as
well as review its own lessons from previous sanctions regimes.18 Strengthening the EU’s capacity
to design and impose sanctions will also allow it to engage more with the United States on the
legal questions concerning listings of individuals. The required legal changes include improving
the legal framework for sanctioning individuals so that well-founded travel and financial sanctions
will be more difficult for perpetrators to challenge in the European Court for Human Rights.
Conflict-Sensitive Development Cooperation
In the context of Germany’s system of strong ministerial autonomy, the fact that R2P belongs,
so to speak, to the Foreign Office has long been a convenient excuse for other ministries to avoid
participating in any possibly controversial discussion on their potential contributions to atrocity
prevention. This is regardless of the fact that several other ministries have been responsible for
important contributions to atrocity prevention themselves. While atrocity prevention or R2P are
thus not formally recognized as relevant issues by the German development apparatus, there is a
longstanding commitment (with its associated institutional backbone) to contributing to conflict
prevention, security, and peacebuilding in development cooperation. The Ministry for Economic
Cooperation and Development has a policy division for “peace & security and disaster risk
reduction,” and the implementing agencies have their own departments on peace and conflict
reduction.
Around two-thirds of the partner countries of German development cooperation are fragile or
in conflict. The Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and its main implementing
agencies, the KfW banking group and the Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ),
claim to implement conflict-sensitive development programming and to follow a do-no-harm
approach. Their analytical foundation for doing so is the country-specific traffic light assessment
mentioned above as well as an internal GIZ classification of countries at risk of conflict. Both
lists are updated once a year. If a given country is marked yellow or red in the annual analysis,
the corresponding programs need to conduct a so-called peace and conflict assessment. This
assessment (in theory) includes an analysis of the main conflict drivers and key actors, identifies
development needs related to the risk factors, outlines options for contributions to peacebuilding
that the suggested project could deliver, describes external risks, and suggests ways to monitor the
implementation of such projects.19 In this context, there should be trainings for all employees in risk
management and conflict sensitivity in crises countries.
In reality, the degree of conflict sensitivity for any given program depends very much on the
country context and its staff. In some cases, conflict sensitivity has been exclusively understood
as reputational risk management for GIZ or its implementing partners, not as minimizing the risk
that a given project escalates a conflict. In some countries – in particular those that receive a high
level of political attention in Berlin – time and pressure to spend money is so high, that there is no
time for proper analysis, trainings, or check-ins for and with implementing partners.20
europa.eu/factsheets/docs/factsheet_eu-mediation-support-team_en.pdf.
17

Interview with policymaker at the US Treasury Department, March 2015, Washington, D.C.
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Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, throughout 2017.
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Support to International Criminal Justice Mechanisms
An area in which the German administration has made promising progress in 2017 is international
criminal justice – again without labeling it atrocity prevention or as relevant to R2P, as was the
case with development cooperation. Until recently, the baseline for German or EU contributions to
the national or international criminal prosecution of atrocity perpetrators was low.21 The German
Federal Criminal Police (Bundeskriminalamt) has a “Central Unit for the Fight against War Crimes
and further Offences pursuant to the Code of Crimes against International Law,” which cooperates
with the war crimes units of international police services in the EU Genocide Network, with the
International Criminal Court, as well as with Europol and Interpol. The level of staffing remains
low, and witness protection as well as stakeholder involvement require improvement.22
The influx of almost a million refugees from Syria and the introduction of universal jurisdiction
in German law has led to significant developments. First, the Federal Prosecutor is investigating
cases in which suspected Syrian war criminals are now on German soil. As of late 2017, German
authorities have conducted 27 investigations against individuals for war crimes committed in Syria
or Iraq, as well as two wide-ranging investigations about Syrian war crimes (so-called structural
investigations without targeting a particular accused individual). Four of the individual cases have
been brought to trial on charges of war crimes or crimes against humanity, in addition to 45 cases
based on terrorism charges.23
Second, it seems that the German Federal Prosecutor is willing to, for the first time, apply the
principle of universal jurisdiction and prosecute high-ranking members of the Assad regime for
war crimes or crimes against humanity. The so-called principle of opportunity has so far given
German prosecutors an out from prosecuting war criminals worldwide (something that would
theoretically be possible within German law). The principle stipulates that if perpetrators are not
in Germany, do not have German citizenship, and the prosecution has little chances for success,
the Office of the Federal Prosecutor (Bundesanwaltschaft) can decide against taking up such as case.
On Syria, however, the fact that thousands of potential victims and witnesses now live in Germany
and that there is more available evidence gathered on the crimes of Syrian regime members,
has significantly increased the chances of success. In mid-2017, the Federal Prosecutor General
(Generalbundesanwalt) seemed willing to bring a case against key members of the Assad regime
to trial (in absentia) in Germany. In the fall of 2017, the Federal Prosecutor was handed the socalled “Ceasar” files, which had been smuggled out of Syria years earlier and document systematic
torture in Syrian prisons with photographic evidence. The German Federal Prosecutor is the first
judicial authority worldwide that could use evidence to issue international arrest warrants against
key members of the Assad regime.
Military Contributions
Despite a growing readiness to deploy German troops, military interventions remain controversial
and their mixed results have only reinforced a tendency to be skeptical about the utility of military
force to achieve political objectives among the German strategic community. Accordingly, for the
Ministry of Defense, atrocity prevention is a difficult issue in several ways. Despite 82% support
in polls for using the military to “prevent acts of genocide”24 and the fact that the public had little
21
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objection to arming and training the Kurdish Peshmerga since 2014, the measure is still considered
unpopular. Preventing or stopping atrocities is also widely seen as irresponsible overreach among
the military itself and the strategic community, partly due to a lack of expeditionary capabilities
and partly because of a lack of familiarity with specific operational and tactical scenarios such as
those developed in the Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) project in the US or similar
work in Norway.25 As a result, neither the Defense Ministry as an institution nor any incumbent
ministers have anything to gain politically by actively looking for expeditionary adventures.
The most likely scenario for a German military contribution to preventing atrocities in the
coming years is through its growing participation in UN peace operations. Since 2015, up to
600 soldiers have been serving with the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali. This tripled German
participation in peacekeeping, which had thus far been limited to contributions to the UN Interim
Force in Lebanon and to a few soldiers each in South Sudan, Darfur, and Liberia, among other
places. At the same time, the German government presents its participation in Mali not as a
contribution to strengthening the UN peacekeeping system and the protection of civilians, but as
a contribution to the fight against terrorism. Similarly, the government contributed to the anti-IS
coalition as a response to French demands.
It is still likely that German contributions to peacekeeping will further increase in the next four
years, and since most peacekeeping operations are mandated to protect civilians, it would be high
time for the German military to familiarize itself with the practical challenges of this particular
mission. So far, there is no doctrine on operational or tactical protection of civilians (POC) in the
Bundeswehr that goes beyond the basics of international humanitarian law.
The other military pillar that Germany is likely to expand in the coming years is military
assistance. A new €100m train and equip program, created in 2016, partly aims to build the
capacity of reliable military contributors to UN, African Union (AU), and other peace operations,
particularly in Africa and the Middle East. This program is set to expand along with a similar police
training component and an older, slightly smaller non-lethal equipment and advisory program.
As the specific projects under these programs move from their historical focus on logistics and
medical support toward frontline capabilities, a focus on operational and tactical protection of
civilians and broader atrocity prevention scenarios such as safe zones will become increasingly
relevant as well.26
Engaging Emerging Powers and Rebuilding Effective International Order
Since the global political fallout over NATO’s abuse of the UN Security Council resolution for
military intervention in Libya 2011,27 leading powers have been unable to find common ground
to discharge their duties in safeguarding international peace and security. The most glaring
example has been the war in Syria. Most major supporters of atrocity prevention turned their
attention away from the multilateral promotion of atrocity prevention toward internal, operational
instruments they were able to improve regardless of the multilateral environment. At the same
time, atrocities take place in a permissive political climate. In an increasingly contested world
order, technical instruments such as prevention, stabilization and development projects through
Politikforschung zur Sicht der Deutschen auf die Außenpolitik [Get in or Keep out? Results of a representative survey by
TNS Infratest Policy Research about the View of Germans on Foreign Policy], October 2014, accessed February 20,
2018, http://www.aussenpolitik-weiter-denken.de/fileadmin/user_upload/allgemein/Koerber-Stiftung_Umfrage_
Aussenpolitik_Broschuere.pdf.
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criminal prosecutions, sanctions, mediation, or military force alone will not stop atrocities. In many
cases, Syria or Burundi being just two of the most obvious current examples, preventing atrocities
remains foremost a problem of international political order.28
For the UN Security Council to overcome its paralysis on atrocity prevention, the Council
needs to address the danger of mandate abuse. Germany, which is seeking another two-year nonpermanent seat for 2019 and 2020, could play a pivotal role in building bridges, having abstained
from the ill-fated mandate for the military intervention in Libya together with the later critics
Brazil, India, Russia and China. Germany could use the Brazilian proposal for “Responsibility
while Protecting” (RwP) as a starting point in such an endeavor. Brazil proposed the idea in late
2011, frustrated with how the Libya intervention had turned into regime change with no checks by
the UN Security Council. At the time, the initiative fell flat,29 but the substantive proposals continue
to be worth another serious look.
RwP focused on two areas that are of continued interest to Germany: the criteria for the use of
force to protect civilians, and the creation of accountability mechanisms for the use of force. Given
the controversies surrounding Resolution 1973, it is unlikely that the Security Council will ever
again pass a resolution to protect civilians with all necessary means without also installing checks
or regulations that give the council more control over an intervention.30
Conclusion
Slowly, Germany is making progress on atrocity prevention, but the issue is far from playing a
key role in Berlin. As our review of Germany’s bureaucratic structures on atrocity prevention has
shown, German contributions to atrocity prevention—whether diplomatic, financial, conceptual or
military—will not fill the gap created by the US retreat in this area any time soon. This is equally
the case for other countries in the European Union and the EU as a whole. Much of the recent
progress, both on the operational and on the doctrinal levels, is the result of nimble bureaucratic
entrepreneurship rather than popular political mobilization or effective lobbying by civil society.
Civil servants, as the name implies, are servants of state and society. More domestic political and
civil society leadership will be required to realize Germany’s stated commitments to preventing
genocide and mass atrocities.
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